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Trade and Colonial Status 
 
Abstract 
Does colonisation explain differences in trade performance across developing countries? In 
this paper, we analyse the differential impact of British versus French colonial legacies on the 
current trade of African ex-colonies. We initially find that former British colonies trade more, 
on average, than do their French counterparts. This difference might be the result of the 
relative superiority of British institutions. However, a core concern is the non-random 
selection of colonies by the British. Historians argue that with Britain, trade preceded 
colonisation. Using an instrument based on colonisation history to control for this 
endogeneity, we find no evidence of a systematic difference between the British and French 
colonial legacies with respect to trade. This finding suggests that the apparent better 
performance of British ex-colonies might be instead explained by pre-colonial conditions. 
Keywords: Trade, colonisation, Africa 
JEL classifications: F10, F54, O55 
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Commerce et statut colonial 
 
Résumé 
La colonisation explique-t-elle les écarts de performance commerciale des pays en 
développement? Pour répondre à cette question, nous exploitons une particularité de l'histoire 
coloniale en comparant l’héritage colonial laissé par les Anglais et les Français en Afrique. 
Nous montrons qu’en moyenne les ex-colonies britanniques commercent davantage 
aujourd’hui que les ex-colonies françaises. Ce résultat pourrait corroborer les travaux 
témoignant de la supériorité relative des institutions britanniques. Cependant, il pourrait 
également s’expliquer par une sélection non aléatoire des colonies britanniques. En effet, les 
études historiques suggèrent que, dans le cas britannique, le commerce a précédé la 
colonisation. Nous utilisons un instrument basé sur l’histoire coloniale pour contrôler ce 
problème d’endogénéité. Il en résulte que la différence entre colonisation britannique et 
française n’a plus d’impact sur le commerce de leurs ex-colonies. Cela suggère que la 
meilleure performance apparente des ex-colonies britanniques pourrait être expliquée par les 
conditions précoloniales. 
Mots-clefs : Commerce, colonisation, Afrique 
Classifications JEL : F10, F54, O55 
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Trade and Colonial Status
1 Introduction
Africa accounts for a tiny share of world trade (2.9% in 2008 according to the WTO).
Even if there is considerable variation across countries, this marginalisation is prob-
lematic.1 International trade is a driver of productivity change and a vehicle of
technology in the interest of catching up with high-income economies (Grossman
and Helpman, 1991). Africa’s marginalisation in international trade is neverthe-
less considered as ‘normal’ with regard to its income level and geography (see Coe
and Hoﬀmaister, 1999; Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993; Rodrik, 1998). Geography
is considered to be an exogenous determinant of trade and strongly aﬀects African
trade, notably through landlockness (Fontagné and Coulibaly, 2006) and ruggedness
(Nunn and Puga, 2009). However, bad geography may be ‘trumped’ by the quality
of institutions (Rodrik et al., 2004). Institutions could be modiﬁed and improved in
ways that would increase trade. For instance, the improvement of the quality and
security of the roads or the reduction of border delays may be expected to result in
signiﬁcantly improved trade performance in Africa (see Freund and Rocha, 2010).
In this paper, we focus on institutions inherited from the colonial period and
their potential eﬀects on the current trade situation of former colonies. Numerous
1As an example, in our sample of 29 African countries (see the list in appendix), the average trade
per capita is US$ 1,402 (representing 4% of that of the leading exporter, i.e., Germany) with high
variability; Gabon has a trade per capita ratio that is 54 times greater than that of the Central
African Republic. These statistics are based on the latest available data reported by the WTO
in March 2010.
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papers have focused on the eﬀect of the colonial legacy on economic growth and
development (see Nunn, 2009).2 However, its eﬀect on trade has scarcely been stud-
ied.3 Africa is a particularly interesting continent in which to examine this issue
for two reasons. First, Africa is a more homogeneous area with respect to the pre-
and post-colonial context than are all former colonies taken together.4 Second, for
the half-century following World War I, France and Britain, the two major colo-
nial European powers, controlled approximately four-ﬁfths of the African continent.
Today, over 36 countries and 770 million people in Africa are concerned by the lega-
cies of British and French colonial institutions. We exploit this historical feature
to investigate the diﬀerential eﬀect of institutions inherited from the colonial pe-
riod on current African trade. This investigation contributes to the recent empirical
literature on the role of institutions in international trade.
2In particular, several studies have shown former British colonies to perform better on average
than their French counterparts in terms of economic growth (e.g., Grier, 1999; Bertocchi and
Canova, 2002). However, Acemoglu et al. (2001) highlight the importance of the conditions in
the colonies and the subsequent strategy of colonisation (extraction versus settlement) indepen-
dent of the identity of the colonising power. They argue that settlement colonies, with their low
mortality rates of European settlers, had institutions that enforced the rule of law and encour-
aged investment. These institutions persisted to the present and determine current economic
development.
3Empirical evidence suggests that ‘common colonial ties’ between the colony and its coloniser
and/or between countries colonised by the same coloniser have strongly aﬀected past colonial
trade (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008) and current trade (e.g., Rose, 2000), even if their impact
partly eroded after independence (Head et al., 2010). Beyond the impact of common colonial ties
on trade, it is unclear whether a country’s prior colonial status matters per se.
4In Central and South America, the process of colonisation dates back to the 16th century and
Asian colonisation is more heterogeneous due to the early experience of India and the speciﬁcities
of Japanese colonisation of Taiwan and Korea (see Bertocchi and Canova, 2002).
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A wealth of social science literature documents the existence of systematic in-
stitutional diﬀerences between the British and French colonial systems.5 There are
three potential sources of institutional diﬀerences in colonial legacies. First, legal
rules diﬀer among legal origins, which were typically introduced through conquest
and colonisation. British common law appears to oﬀer stronger legal protections to
investors than does French civil law, implying more developed ﬁnancial markets (La
Porta et al., 1997, 1998). British common law countries are also characterised by a
lower level of corruption (Treisman, 2000), better government eﬃciency, more secure
property rights, and better (less intrusive) regulation than French civil law countries
(La Porta et al., 1999 and La Porta et al., 2008 for a review). Second, the British
more often opted for the so-called ‘indirect rule’ working through indigenous rulers
and preserving traditional institutions. In contrast, the French adopted a more di-
rect rule of administration, abolishing indigenous institutions, and imposing colonial
oﬃcers in a Jacobin tradition of omnipresence of the republican state (e.g., Crowder,
1968). These diﬀerences in colonial rule may have long-term eﬀects on institutional
quality and governance (Lange, 2004; Nunn, 2007).6 Overall, diﬀerences in legal
origin and in colonial rule may impact trade. Cross-country diﬀerences in the qual-
ity of institutions are now recognised to inﬂuence international trade, especially in
5There is a debate among historians of the ‘contrast’ school, who argue that colonial powers had
diﬀerent colonial philosophies (e.g., Crowder, 1968) and those of the ‘similarity’ school, who point
out a tendency of the contrast school to exaggerate diﬀerences rather than similarities between
colonial policies (e.g., Fieldhouse, 1982; Firmin-Sellers, 2000; Kiwanuka, 1970).
6Lange (2004) ﬁnds a negative relationship between the extent of indirect rule and various measures
of post-colonial governance. However, he only focuses on British ex-colonies.
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contract enforcement, protection of property rights, and corruption (Anderson and
Marcoullier, 2002; Levchenko, 2007 and Rauch, 1999). Furthermore, the attitude
of the British Empire towards international trade was quite diﬀerent from that of
the other European powers, among them France. Britain had a free trade colonial
policy and colonial trade was open to all foreign countries until 1932, whereas the
French generally enforced mercantilist and protectionist measures in colonial trade
(see Bairoch, 1989; Fieldhouse, 1982; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, chap 7, pp. 401-
02). Such institutional diﬀerences may be a source of comparative advantage.
To investigate the diﬀerential eﬀect of British and French institutional legacies
on current African trade, we use a theoretical gravity model and a large sample
of countries. We initially ﬁnd that former British colonies in Africa trade more,
on average, than do their French counterparts. This ‘British eﬀect’ is robust to
multilateral resistances and speciﬁc observable diﬀerences between the British and
French Empires. We further investigate the source of this ‘British eﬀect,’ as it might
be related to speciﬁc pre-colonial trade patterns.
A core concern is, indeed, the non-random selection of colonies by the British.
Historians argue that British colonisation seems related to pre-colonial trade (e.g.,
Crowder, 1968; Fage, 2002). Indeed, looking closely into the history of African
colonisation, we ﬁnd evidence that “with Britain trade preceded the ﬂag, or directed
where the ﬂag should be ﬂown” (Crowder, 1968, p. 70). Selection, based on pre-
colonial trade may produce an overestimation of the ‘British eﬀect’. To overcome
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this endogeneity bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. The reliability of
this approach lies on the identiﬁcation of an appropriate instrument for the British
colonisation.
To instrument the probability of being colonised by the British, we exploit a
striking feature of colonisation in Africa: the ‘race’ between European powers. In
less than thirty years starting from the mid 1870’s, most of Africa was colonised and
divided up between the British and the French (Pakenham, 1992). This ‘Scramble
for Africa’ was encouraged by European rivalries (e.g., Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1970;
Gallagher, Robinson, 1953; Griﬃth, 1993). The French expansion led Britain to ap-
prove and support formal annexation (instead of a simple occupation of particular
areas). Based on this feature, we construct a simple instrument explaining coloni-
sation: the area (in square kilometres) colonised by the other empire in Africa at
the time of colonisation of a given territory. Figure 1 plots the logarithm of the
area colonised by the French against the year in which each British territory was
colonised, showing a strong positive relationship.
This instrument seems consistent with the non-random selection of British colonies
and should have no eﬀect on current trade, other than the eﬀect through British
colonisation. In fact, the very ﬁrst colonies may have been the ones where there
was minimal colonisation by the other power and are also likely to be the ones that
had excellent pre-colonial trade opportunities. In the ﬁrst stage of our instrumental
variable approach, we ﬁnd that an increase in the size of the French empire leads
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to an increase of the area colonised by the British. In the second stage, the initial
‘British eﬀect’ vanishes. Indeed, controlling for the endogeneity in the relationship
between colonisation and trade, we ﬁnd no evidence of a systematic diﬀerential eﬀect
of British versus French colonisation on former colonies’ current trade. We interpret
this result in light of the role played by the pre-colonial conditions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the empir-
ical model. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss some estimation issues. In
Section 4, we report the basic estimates of the ‘British eﬀect’ on international trade
of former colonies. In Section 5, we address the endogeneity between colonisation
and trade. Finally, in Section 6, we summarise and discuss our ﬁndings.
2 Empirical model
To investigate the eﬀect of the colonial status of the former British and French
colonies on current trade, we use a theoretical gravity model (see Anderson and
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van Wincoop, 2003). This model relates the bilateral exports (Xij) of country i to
country j to the size of their respective economies (Yi and Yj), their implicit price
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ij is a list of observable arguments that aﬀect bilateral trade, such as
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distance, common language, regional free trade agreements, and common colonial
relationships (i.e., between colonisers and their former colonies or between countries
colonised by the same coloniser). In addition, we aim to measure the diﬀerential
eﬀect of British versus French colonial legacies on trade. We argue that this diﬀer-
ence may result in diﬀerences in trade costs aﬀecting the volume of trade. As noted
above, British common law countries appear to have less corruption, better contract
enforcement, and better protection of property rights. This overall higher institu-
tional quality may reduce trade costs (Anderson and Marcoullier, 2002; Levchenko,
2007 and Rauch, 1999). Moreover, the British favoured free trade policies, whereas
the French generally enforced protectionist measures. This may also translate into
diﬀerences in trade costs. Hence, to capture the diﬀerential impact of British and
French legacies on trade cost we introduce in equation (4) a British_coli=j dummy
variable that is equal to one if the exporter (i) or the importer (j) is a former British
colony and 0 if it is a former French colony (see below). Accordingly, we expect γuk
to be positive.
Applying a log transformation to equation (1), replacing the trade cost factor
with the set of observable elements in equation (4), introducing time subscripts
and adding the traditional error term ϵijt, which captures all other determinants of
bilateral trade, yields:






+ α(British_col)i=j   (1   σ)Pit   (1   σ)Pjt + ϵijt, (5)
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where k is a constant, λm = (1   σ)γm, and α = (σ   1)γuk.
The coeﬃcient of interest to us is α, which measures the diﬀerential impact
of British versus French colonial legacies on the current trade of former African
colonies. The estimation of α raises some issues about: (1) the sample designed for
interpretation of the diﬀerential eﬀect of the colonial status; (2) the estimation of
the multilateral resistances that depend on trade barriers between each country and
all of its trading partners (not just the bilateral partner); and (3) the endogenous
selection of the British colonies. In the next section, we present the data and address
the ﬁrst two estimation issues. Then, after presenting a benchmark estimation of α,
we will devote a section to the endogeneity issue.
3 Data and estimation issues
3.1 Data
Our sample includes 53 countries, of which 29 are African countries, all of which are
former French or British colonies, and 24 non-African countries (21 OECD countries
and 3 large emerging countries - Brazil, Russia and China). The list of countries is
detailed in appendix (Table 3). The time period of our sample is 2000-2006. Trade
data come from the DOTS database provided by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Other variables such as GDP were obtained from various sources (see Table 4
in appendix).
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3.2 Estimation issues
The ﬁrst issue concerns the design of the sample. The overall sample comprises
all bilateral trade relationships between our 53 African and non-African countries,
i.e., potentially 19,292 observations (53  52 countries  7 years). This overall sam-
ple allows for general results, but complicates the interpretation of our variable of
interest, the British_coli=j dummy. In fact, in this sample, trade performances
of former British colonies are not strictly compared with those of former French
colonies. To compare these two groups of colonies directly, we introduce into the
regression a dummy variable (called NonAfricaij) identifying trade between non-
African countries, i.e., OECD or emerging countries. In this way, former French
colonies become the base group against which all comparisons are made. We also
adopt a diﬀerent strategy to identify the British colonisation eﬀect. We use a re-
duced sample, focusing on bilateral trade between African countries and non-African
countries. This use amounts to a removal from the overall sample of the trade re-
lationships (1) between non-African countries, and (2) between African countries.
This reduced sample comprises potentially 9,744 observations (29 African countries
 24 OECD or emerging countries  7 years  2). In this case, if the exporter i is an
OECD or an emerging country, the importer j is always a former British colony or
a former French colony. Conversely, if the exporter i is a former British or French
colony, the importer j is always an OECD or an emerging country. In this reduced
sample, the deﬁnition of the British_coli=j dummy implies that the former French
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colonies are the base group against which comparisons are made.7
A second major issue is the control of time-dependent and country speciﬁc mul-
tilateral resistance indices, (Pit) and (Pjt). We use four diﬀerent speciﬁcations to
address this issue. The ﬁrst is a fairly simple and eﬃcient approach. We use an OLS
estimator with a vector of exporter and importer country dummies and estimate
equation (5) year-by-year (e.g., Feenstra, 2004). In the second speciﬁcation, we use
again an OLS estimator with a vector of country-year dummies (i.e., country dum-
mies interacted with year dummies) and estimate equation (5) on the panel sample
(2000-2006) (e.g., Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006).8 These two speciﬁcations are ap-
propriate only for the overall sample, however. In the reduced sample, our variable
of interest (British_coli=j) would be absorbed by the country or the country-year
dummy variables. A third solution to capture multilateral resistance indices in our
(overall or reduced) panel data set consists of using the within estimator. This so-
lution entails the introduction of country-pair dummies (called dyad ﬁxed eﬀects)
instead of country dummies. In this way, we control for any time-invariant factor
aﬀecting bilateral trade, i.e., country- and dyad-speciﬁc factors. Using this third
speciﬁcation, we implicitly assume the multilateral resistance terms to change little
over time. This assumption seems reasonable, as we consider a short time period
7Note that, as in Acemoglu et al. (2001), we are interested here in the eﬀect of diﬀerent colonial
legacies, conditional on being colonised.
8Instead of the OLS estimator, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest the use of a Poisson
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (PQML) with country or country-year dummies to avoid
selection bias due to the existence of zero trade observations. However, we elected not to use the
PQML estimator because we have very few zero trade observations (ranging from 6% to 8% of all
observations, depending on the sample).
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from 2000 to 2006. A caveat of the within estimator is its inability to estimate the
coeﬃcient of our variable of interest, i.e., the British_coli=j dummy, which is time-
invariant. To solve this problem, we adopt a fourth speciﬁcation using the Mundlak
(1978) approach. The Mundlak approach reconciles the random eﬀect estimator and
the within estimator.9 It posits that the dyad ﬁxed eﬀects can be projected upon
the group means of the time-varying variables. As a consequence, addition of the
mean of the time-varying variables to the equation picks up the correlation between
the dyad ﬁxed eﬀects and the explanatory variables. In this case, a random eﬀect
estimator should yield unbiased estimates (see Wooldridge, 2002). In panel speci-
ﬁcations 3 and 4, we also add a vector of time dummies to control for the general
evolution of trade.
4 Baseline estimates: the ‘British eﬀect’
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1. We use the overall sample in the ﬁrst
four columns and the reduced sample in the last two columns (see above).
In column (1), we estimate equation (5) on the overall sample for a single year
(2006).10 In this cross-sectional model, we introduce a vector of exporter and im-
porter country dummies (speciﬁcation 1). They account for the multilateral resis-
tance terms and all the other country characteristics, including market size. In this
9Recall that the random eﬀect estimator is inconsistent when some of the explanatory variables are
correlated with the unobserved dyad ﬁxed eﬀects, while the within estimates are always unbiased.
10Note that the results are not sensitive to the choice of a particular year. Year-by-year regressions
are available upon request.
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speciﬁcation, all coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, except for the common lan-
guage dummy variable. As expected, a larger distance between the trade participants
deters bilateral trade, while regional trade agreements (RTA) favour trade. Former
common colonial relationships also matter. Two countries that have been colonised
by the same coloniser (France or Great Britain) still trade nearly eight times more
[=exp(2.07)], all other things being equal. We also ﬁnd that both France and Great
Britain have special trade relationships with their ex-colonies, mirroring other es-
timates in the literature (e.g., Rauch, 1999; Rose, 2000; Glick and Taylor, 2006).
However, the results show that France trades more with its ex-colonies than does
Great Britain. The diﬀerence between ColonUKij and ColonFRAij is indeed statis-
tically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding may reﬂect the persistency of a colonial legacy related
to the attitude towards trade. As pointed out above, the British Empire favoured
free trade policies, whereas the French generally enforced protectionist measures in
their colonial trade (see Bairoch, 1989; Fieldhouse, 1982; Findlay and O’Rourke,
2007, chap 7, pp. 401-02). Thus, French colonies were forced to import from France,
to sell their goods to France and to use French ships.
Recall that our overall sample comprises all bilateral trade relationships between
our 53 African and non-African countries. Accordingly, to compare the trade perfor-
mance of former British colonies with that of former French colonies, we add into the
regression a dummy variable (NonAfricaij) identifying trade between non-African
countries. Former French colonies thus become the base group against which all com-
16Working Paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-12
parisons are made. Thus, we ﬁnd that countries that were colonised by the British
trade as much as 4.5 times more [=exp(1.51)] than do those that were colonised by
the French, all other things being equal. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd a negative estimate
for the non-African bilateral dummy (NonAfricaij). This could be because our
ﬁrst speciﬁcation with country dummies does not account properly for the bilateral
factors aﬀecting bilateral trade (see below).
In column (2), we estimate equation (5) on the overall sample for the whole time
period 2000-2006. We use our second speciﬁcation and introduce country-year ﬁxed
eﬀects to account for time-varying multilateral resistance terms, as suggested by
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The British_Coli=j coeﬃcient is still highly signiﬁcant
and diﬀers little from its estimate in column (1).
In column (3), we use the same sample and time period as in column (2). How-
ever, we now use the within estimator (speciﬁcation 3) to control for any bilateral
time-independent factor aﬀecting bilateral trade. This benchmark estimation is
then compared with the estimates of column (4). In this latter column, we use the
Mundlak (1978) approach (speciﬁcation 4), i.e., we add to the estimated equation
the means of all time-varying regressors (the GDP variables and the RTA dummy)
and use a random eﬀect estimator. As expected, the coeﬃcients on the time-varying
variables are very similar in columns (3) and (4). The estimate of the British_Coli=j
dummy is of smaller magnitude than in the ﬁrst two columns, yet still highly signif-
icant. This ﬁnding indicates that, on average, a former British colony trades 43%
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Table 1: Baseline results
Dep. var: ln of bilateral exports
Method Country FE Country- Dyad FE Dyad RE Dyad RE Dyad RE
year FE Mundlak Mundlak Mundlak
Time period 2006 2000-2006 2000-2006 2000-2006 2000-2006 2000-2006
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
British_Coli=j 1.51a 1.26a - 0.36a 0.55a 0.48a
(0.34) (0.29) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
ln GDPit - - 0.47a 0.46a 0.46a 0.57a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15)
ln GDPjt - - 0.37a 0.35a 0.37a 0.36a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
ln Distanceij -1.51a -1.43a - -0.98a -1.02a -1.27a
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Languageij 0.16 0.26b - 0.24b 0.03 0.04
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
rtaijt 0.45a 0.32a 0.11 0.11 0.21b 0.21b
(0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
NonAfricaij -0.46b -0.20 - 0.43a - -
(0.21) (0.16) (0.11)
Comcolij 2.07a 1.95a - 1.38a - -
(0.26) (0.22) (0.18)
ColonUKij 1.30a 1.26a - 1.09a 0.94a 0.89a
(0.25) (0.27) (0.30) (0.31) (0.33)
ColonFRAij 2.32a 2.35a - 2.12a 2.22a 2.14a











Rule of Lawit=jt 0.01
(0.12)
R-sq 0.83 0.82 0.65 0.76 0.61 0.64
# of observations 2,503 17,167 17,077 17,077 8,963 7,619
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in parentheses. a, b and c: signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level resp. FE=ﬁxed eﬀects; RE=random eﬀects. Sample: overall in col. (1)-(4),
reduced in col. (5)-(6). Speciﬁc eﬀects and means of time-varying variables (col. 4-6) are not reported.
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[=exp(0.36)-1] more with OECD, emerging and African countries than does a former
French colony. The Mundlak speciﬁcation is our preferred speciﬁcation. It controls
more properly for country-pair (unobserved) factors aﬀecting bilateral trade. As a
consequence, it avoids overestimation of the coeﬃcient of the British_Coli=j vari-
able. Moreover, the NonAfricaij estimate appears now to be positive.
In the last two columns, we use the Mundlak speciﬁcation on the reduced sample,
focusing on the trade of African countries (i.e., former French and British colonies)
with OECD and emerging countries. This sample eases the interpretation of the
British_Coli=j dummy (see section 3). Estimation results reported in column (5)
are broadly similar to those in column (4), which corresponds to the overall sam-
ple. There are a few exceptions, however. The magnitude of the British eﬀect is
slightly larger due to the removal of trade between African countries from the sam-
ple. Without speculating too much about the diﬀerences in magnitude, this result
suggests that the relative advantage of former British colonies is larger for trade
with OECD and emerging countries than it is for trade with African countries. The
common language dummy becomes no longer signiﬁcant. This dummy appears to
be highly correlated with the common colonial variables (Comcol, ColonUK and
ColonFRA), especially in the reduced sample. The regional trade agreement (RTA)
variable becomes statistically signiﬁcant.
A concern is that our results may be driven, at least in part, by omitted system-
atic diﬀerences between the former British and French colonies. These diﬀerences
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may impact their current trade and explain the British eﬀect. We address this con-
cern in column (6). We introduce into the regression ﬁve country characteristics
to further diﬀerentiate the groups.11 First, the use of English as the world’s dom-
inant language could oﬀer the former British colonies an advantage in promoting
international trade. Thus, we introduce a variable measuring the fraction of the
population speaking English using data from Hall and Jones (1999). Second, geog-
raphy inﬂuences trade costs in Africa (see Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2006) and may
be a source of potential diﬀerences between both groups. Thus, we add a dummy
variable identifying landlocked countries. Third, we control for the diﬀerent natural
resources endowments of former British and French colonies. The former British
Empire includes major gold producers, such as South Africa or Zimbabwe, while
several ex-French colonies such as Gabon or Congo are specialised in oil production.
Consequently, we introduce into the estimated equation two variables measuring the
annual average per capita production of gold and oil between 1970 and 2000 (in log
terms). Fourth, we add an index of infrastructure quality constructed by Limao and
Venables (2001) from road, rail and telecommunication density. Infrastructure af-
fects trade costs, and the apparent higher infrastructure quality of British ex-colonies
could explain their better trade performance (see Table 5 in appendix). Finally, we
add an indicator measuring the current institutional quality in former colonies. We
use the index of rule of law developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008), which aims to
11See Table 5 in appendix for raw diﬀerences between the former British and French colonies and
Table 4 for deﬁnition and sources of the variables.
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capture the quality of contract enforcement, security of property rights, and pre-
dictability of the judiciary (see also Levchenko, 2007). Using this rough measure,
we observe the institutional quality to be higher in the former British colonies than
in the French ones (see Table 5 in appendix).
The estimation results for these additional control variables are largely as ex-
pected. As in Melitz (2008), we ﬁnd that the use of English has no speciﬁc impact
on trade.12 Moreover, landlocked countries are found to trade less than coastal
countries. Gold production slightly increases trade, while oil production appears
to have a negative and less signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade. Better infrastructure (i.e., a
lower value of the index) reinforces trade. Finally, the rule of law index does not
seem to impact trade.13 Other estimates are only slightly aﬀected. In particular,
the estimate of the British_Coli=j variable remains positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Thus, none of these additional current country characteristics appears to explain
why former British colonies perform signiﬁcantly better in terms of trade than do
their French counterparts.
In summary, despite diﬀerences in magnitude, the cross section and panel es-
timates reveal a positive and signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect of British versus French
12Melitz (2008) ﬁnds that major European languages are important vectors of international trade,
but English appears to be no more eﬀective at fostering trade than are the other major European
languages, including French.
13We have instead introduced a Rule of Law_it variable for the exporter and a Rule of Law_it
variable for the importer. We ﬁnd that the impact is positive and signiﬁcant for the importer
country but not for the exporter country. This ﬁnding is in line with the idea that the exporter
incurs some ﬁxed costs to export and cares about the importer’s legal framework in cases of
disputes.
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colonial legacies on current international trade of former colonies.
5 Endogeneity issues: history matters!
Previous results indicate that former British colonies trade more than their French
counterparts. However, the estimation of equation (5) might be aﬀected by an
endogeneity bias in the relationship between colonisation and trade. A positive
correlation between British colonisation and trade may simply reﬂect the role of
pre-colonial trade patterns. In the ﬁrst sub-section, we present historical evidence
for the importance of pre-colonial trade for the British and their strategy of coloni-
sation. In a second sub-section, we present our instrumental variable strategy and
the estimates.
5.1 Historical evidence
Based on her sea-power, Britain was quite inﬂuential in Africa starting from the eigh-
teenth century. Compelling historical evidence suggests that Britain was attracted,
prior to the Berlin conference (1884-1885), by the economic opportunities in Africa,
and by foreign trade in particular. On the export side, Britain was looking for out-
lets for her manufactured goods. This was the time of the Industrial Revolution.
Thus, “a sizeable proportion of British shipping, trading and manufacturing capital
had become dependent on selling goods to Africa, and to West Africa in particular”
(Fage, 2002, p. 334). On the import side, Britain sought to secure supplies of raw
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materials.14 However, at that time, Britain exerted her inﬂuence without any for-
mal annexation of large territories.15 Colonisation was considered too costly. Thus,
before the Berlin Conference and the ‘Scramble for Africa’, the British developed
commercial interests in Africa and helped their traders in their business without
engaging in colonisation (e.g., Crowder, 1968; Wesseling, 2002).
In contrast, “the French interest cannot be so surely demonstrated in economic
terms” (Fage, 2002). France, lagging behind, did not have the same pressing needs
for African products and markets. Its economy was far less dependent on foreign
trade than was Britain’s (Fage, 2002). France’s interest in Africa was more related to
political pressures (Fieldhouse, 1982). Conquest was seen as a means to compensate
for the humiliating defeat against the Germans in 1871 and was supposed to oﬀer
great opportunities for promotion and honors of the military.
The French strategy of conquest exacerbated European rivalry. This rivalry is
a crucial factor that explains the British change of attitude toward colonisation
and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ (e.g., Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1970; Gallagher, Robinson,
1953; Griﬃth, 1993). The threat of foreign expansion led Britain to accept formal
annexation and to engage in the scramble. “After 1888, Salisbury, Rosebery and
Chamberlain accepted the Scramble for Africa as a painful but unavoidable necessity
which arose from a threat of foreign expansion and the irrepressible tendency of trade
14For instance, palm oil, used as a lubricant for industrial machinery, was a vital commodity for
Britain’s industrial expansion.
15Before the Berlin Conference, the British had limited their colonial commitments to small enclaves
on the coast from which they could secure their trading interests.
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to overﬂow the bounds of empire” (Gallagher, Robinson, 1953, p.12). Thus, in a very
short period of time, most of Africa was colonised and divided up among European
powers (Pakenham, 1992).
The example of West Africa is particularly striking in illustrating diﬀerences
between the British and French colonisation strategies (see Crowder, 1968 and Fage,
2002). For France, land quantity appeared more important than their quality. In
contrast, “the areas Britain claimed were those in which her traders had been active,
or saw future proﬁt. Thus where with France, the ﬂag tended to precede trade, with
Britain trade preceded the ﬂag, or directed where the ﬂag should be ﬂown, with the
result that Britain gained the smaller but richer part of West Africa” (Crowder, 1968,
p. 70). This historical evidence leads to the hypothesis that the British selected their
colonies based on their pre-colonial trading patterns.
5.2 Instrumental variable estimates
Formally, the above historical evidence amounts to a correlation between the error
term and the British colonisation variable. To overcome this endogeneity bias, an
indicator reﬂecting pre-colonial trade could be introduced to the estimated equation.
However, data on pre-colonial trade are not readily accessible. As a result, we pursue
a diﬀerent strategy. To account for this typical endogeneity problem, we use an
instrumental variable (IV) estimator, as described in Wooldridge (2002). The ﬁrst
step consists of the estimation of a Probit equation that explains the probability of
being colonised by the British as a function of some observable factors, including an
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instrument (i.e., an exclusion variable).
We exploit a striking feature of colonisation in Africa to ﬁnd an instrument for
British colonisation: the ‘race’ between European powers. As pointed out above, the
French expansion led Britain to approve and support formal annexation. In West
Africa for instance, the French advance on the lower Niger at the beginning of the
1880’s urged Britain to formally annex Nigeria. Hence, one natural instrument for
British colonisation is a measure of the area colonised by the other empire in Africa
before the formal colonisation of a given territory.16 Figure 1 (see above) reveals
a strong positive relationship between the area colonised in Africa by the French
and the year in which the British territories were colonised. Our instrumentation
strategy, conditional on the controls included in the regression, is based on the idea
that the area colonised by the French in Africa has no eﬀect on the current trade of
former British colonies other than the eﬀect through British colonisation.
Construction of the instrument is as follows. First, for each former British and
French colony, we determine the year of ﬁrst annexation as reported in the Cor-
relates of War (COW) database.17 In most cases, the year of the ﬁrst annexation
corresponds to what is currently recognised as the date of colonisation (see Table 3
in appendix). Then, we measure the total area (in square kilometers) annexed by
the other major coloniser (France for a British colony or Britain for a French one)
16To control for the endogeneity between colonisation and past colonial trade, Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2008) also use an IV approach. Their instrument for empire is the ﬁve-year lagged
value of the world size of other empires.
17Correlates of War Project. Territorial Change Dataset. Version 3.0. Online:
http://correlatesofwar.org. See Tir et al. (1998).
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in Africa before the year of ﬁrst annexation of a given colony.18 Thus, for each for-
mer colony, we obtain a quantitative measure of the extension of the other Empire
before colonisation. This variable should proxy the extent of foreign expansion that
contributes to explain formal colonisation. We specify this excluded instrument in
a logarithmic form.
The results of the IV estimates are reported in Table 2. The bottom row of
column (1) corresponds to the ﬁrst stage estimation and shows that our instrument,
the log of the size of the other empire, has a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of British colonisation.19 Furthermore, as expected, the estimate is positive. This
suggests that, other things being equal, the British tended to increase their empire
with the French colonial expansion. This result supports the simple correlation
shown in Figure 1.
In the second stage, we use the estimated probability to compute an unbiased
estimate of the impact of British versus French colonisation on trade. We use the
Mundlak speciﬁcation on the reduced panel as in column (5) of Table 1. Results of
this second stage are reported at the top of Table 2 (column 1).20 Strikingly, the es-
timate of the British_coli=j dummy is no longer signiﬁcant. Hence, the endogeneity
18Data on annexed area also come from the COW database (see Table 4 in appendix).
19The gravity regressors also signiﬁcantly impact the probability of being colonised by the British
(results are available upon request). Note, however, that in the ﬁrst stage, the model used to
explain the probability of being colonised by the British does not have to be correctly speciﬁed
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 623).
20Note that, in this speciﬁcation, several coeﬃcients of our empirical model cannot be esti-
mated. Comcol and NonAfrica are not relevant in the reduced panel. Moreover, ColonUK
and ColonFRA are dropped because they predict success or failure perfectly in the ﬁrst stage.
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Table 2: Instrumental variable (IV) estimates
IV results (stage II)
Dyad RE Mundlak
Reduced sample




ln GDPit 0.46a 0.52a
(0.08) (0.09)
ln GDPjt 0.37a 0.35a
(0.08) (0.09)







# of observations 8,566 7,434
Year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes




ln AreaEmpirei=j 0.22a 0.34a
(0.03) (0.03)
Wald stat. 73.53 93.15
p-value 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in paren-
theses. a and b denote the signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level
respectively. The constant, year dummies and the coeﬃcients on
the mean of time-varying variables are not reported. Other control
variables in the ﬁrst stage regression are not reported. See text for
more details.
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bias seems to account for the majority of the initial British eﬀect.
This result could be aﬀected by a weak instrument problem. If the instrumental
variable correlates only weakly with the endogenous explanatory variable (British
versus French colonisation), then statements of statistical signiﬁcance may be mis-
leading. However, the Wald statistic for the ﬁrst stage regression is quite high.
Moreover, it is reassuring that the standard errors on the second stage estimates are
not much larger than those in the basic random eﬀect model of Table 1, with the
exception of the British_coli=j dummy.
To test the robustness of our results and further minimise a potential weak
instrument problem, we drop from the sample the very ﬁrst British colonies (Egypt
in 1882, Botswana and South Africa in 1885). These areas were already colonised
at the very beginning of the Scramble. When we drop these ﬁrst British ex-colonies,
our instrument appears to give an even better prediction of British versus French
colonisation (see bottom row of column 2). The second stage estimates, reported at
the top of column (2), are qualitatively similar. Again, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
of a British eﬀect.
Hence, it seems that the apparent better trade performance of former British
colonies (the ‘British’ eﬀect) is largely explained by pre-colonial trade patterns.
When we do not control for such pre-colonial conditions, the ‘British eﬀect’ is over-
estimated. It is impossible to determine with certainty the exact origin of these
favourable pre-colonial conditions in future British colonies, but one possible in-
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terpretation relates to the British inﬂuence. As noted above, Britain was quite
inﬂuential in Africa starting from the eighteenth century and trade preceded the
ﬂag. Hence, before formal colonisation, Britain may have implemented institutions
favouring trade and a pro-free trade attitude in its future colonised areas. This pro-
free trade attitude could have resulted in larger trade ﬂows between future colonies
and Britain, as well as with other countries.
6 Concluding remarks
From the mid 1870’s onwards, the ‘Scramble for Africa’ gave Britain and France
virtually the entire African continent. We use this historical evidence to evaluate the
impact of the British and French colonial legacies on the current trade performance
of former colonies. This research relates to a growing literature linking Africa’s
current under-development to colonial legacies. Numerous papers have focused on
the eﬀect of the colonial legacy on economic growth and development. However, its
eﬀect on trade has scarcely been studied. It is unclear whether a country’s prior
colonial status matters per se. Do the diﬀerent legacies associated with the British
and French colonial powers matter? If so, it could be advisable to adapt institutions
in one particular direction.
Using a theoretically founded gravity model of trade, we initially ﬁnd that former
British colonies trade more on average than do their French counterparts. This
result is in line with the literature emphasising the relative superiority of British
institutions and could lead to the conclusion that the institutional environment left
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by the British is more conducive to trade. However, a core concern is the endogenous
selection of colonies by the British. The current trade performance of former British
colonies could be explained by their pre-colonial trade patterns. Indeed, historical
evidence suggests that “with Britain trade preceded the ﬂag, or directed where the
ﬂag should be ﬂown” (Crowder, 1968, p. 70). After controlling for the non-random
selection of the former British colonies, we ﬁnd no evidence of a systematic diﬀerence
between British and French colonial legacies.
Thus, the identity of the coloniser does not seem to impact the current trade
performance of former colonies. This result may corroborate the ‘similarity’ school,
which emphasises that the colonial experience was not so diﬀerent under the major
colonial powers (see section 1). As argued by Acemoglu et al. (2001), “researchers
are [probably] overestimating how ‘bad’ French institutions are” (p. 1388). However,
our ﬁnding could also mean that the systematic diﬀerences between the two types
of colonial institutions have been simply reduced or eliminated over time. In other
words, diﬀerences in colonial institutions could not have persisted long enough to
aﬀect the current trade of the former colonies.
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Appendix
Table 3: List of countries in our sample with the year of ﬁrst annexation in brackets
Former French Colonies Former British Colonies OECD and Emerging countries
Benin (1894) Botswana (1885) Australia
Burkina Faso (1895) Egypt (1882) Austria
Central African Republic (1894) Ghana (1896) Belgium-Luxembourg
Ivory Coast (1889) Gambia (1889) Canada
Cameroon (1919) Kenya (1890) Denmark
Congo (1880) Nigeria (1898) Germany
Algeria (1830) Tanzania (1920) Finland
Gabon (1885) Uganda (1894) Great Britain
Guinea (1849) South Africa (1885) Greece
Morocco (1903) Zambia (1891) Ireland
Madagascar (1896) Zimbabwe (1893) France
Mali (1891) Italy
Mauritania (1909) Japan
Niger (1893) the Netherlands
Senegal (1817) Norway
Chad (1911) Portugal








Notes: Data on the year of ﬁrst annexation are computed using the Correlates of War database
(Territorial Change Dataset. Version 3.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org). See text for
more details and Table 4.
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Table 4: Data and variable deﬁnitions
Xijt Export data come from the IMF (DOTS database).
GDPit=jt Current GDP data come from the World Bank (WDI database).
Distanceij
Languageij
Bilateral distance and common language dummies come from the cepii database. See
www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm
Rtaijt The Regional Trade Agreement dummy is computed using informations from the
WTO.
Landlockedi=j Dummy variable identifying landlocked countries. Data come from Nunn (2008).
Gold and Oil
Productioni=j
Annual average per capita production between 1970 and 2000 of gold and oil. Data
come from Nunn (2008).
Engfraci=j Fraction of the population speaking English. Data come from Hall and Jones (1999).
Infrai=j Index constructed from road, paved road and rail densities and telephone main lines
per person. A higher value indicates worse infrastructure. Data come from Limao
and Venables (2001).
Rule of lawi=j Index measuring the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules
of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5,
with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Data come from
Kaufmann et al. (2008).
AreaEmpirei=j Total area (in square kilometers) annexed by the other coloniser (France for British
colonies or Great Britain for French ones) before the date of ﬁrst annexation (see Ta-
ble 3). Data on area and date of annexation come from the Correlates of War database
(Territorial Change Dataset. Version 3.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org. See Tir
and al., 1998). The date of a treaty is used as the date of annexation. If no treaty
was involved in the territorial change, then this date corresponds to the date (a)
when action to take the territorial ceased, (b) a plebiscite occurred, or (c) an act of
annexation took place.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Former British colonies Former French colonies Diﬀerence
# of obs. Mean Std Dev. # of obs. Mean Std Dev. Diﬀ. Std Err.
ln Exports 1,613 1.999 3.383 2,682 0.754 3.716 1.244 0.113
ln Imports 1,813 2.900 2.702 2,901 2.140 2.549 0.759 0.078
ln GDP 1,824 23.267 1.617 3,024 22.472 1.153 0.794 0.039
ln Distance 1,848 8.906 0.424 3,024 8.655 0.596 0.251 0.016
Language 1,848 0.227 0.419 3,024 0.129 0.336 0.097 0.011
RTA 1,848 0.070 0.256 3,024 0.060 0.238 0.010 0.007
ColonFra 1,848 0 0 3,024 0.041 0.200 -0.041 0.004
ColonBrit 1,848 0.042 0.200 3,024 0 0 0.042 0.003
EngFrac 1,848 0.015 0.001 3,024 0 0 0.015 0.000
Landlocked 1,848 0.364 0.481 3,024 0.278 0.448 0.086 0.014
Gold Prod 1,848 2.358 0.144 3,024 0.083 0.002 2.275 0.113
Oil Prod 1,848 0.168 0.008 3,024 1.141 0.059 -0.973 0.076
Infrastructure 1,386 1.663 0.007 2,618 2.438 0.018 -0.775 0.026
Rule of Law 1,848 -0.463 0.618 3,024 -0.703 0.490 0.240 0.016
ln AreaEmpire 1,848 14.940 0.517 3,024 14.210 2.462 0.730 0.058
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